Basic Competence

From "The Trouble With Elections: Everything We Thought We Knew About Democracy is Wrong," Chapter 13.2

The American jury system allows us to gain certain insights into the issue of civic apathy and basic competence. But, it should be noted at the outset that the existing jury system is deficient compared to democratic sortition. Procedures such as peremptory challenges, which enable lawyers to shape a jury to their side’s advantage, and the rules of evidence, etc. can manipulate a jury. While we are all aware of criminal cases in which we disagree with a given jury’s decision, on the whole, juries are highly regarded by both the general public and judges. Juries overcome both apathy and incompetence. In their book, Judging the Jury, Valerie Hans and Neil Vidmar, two of the nation's leading experts on the American jury system, observe that hundreds of studies suggest that actual jury incompetence is rare. They note that bad decisions, which inevitably do occur, stem from factors unrelated to competence.  A 2012 Rasmussen Reports public opinion survey found that sixty-five percent of Americans put more faith in a jury of their peers than a judge, while just twenty-one percent have more faith in a judge, with the rest undecided.

Likewise, several studies confirm that jurors themselves generally gain a sense of satisfaction from serving, despite common grousing about the inconvenience of jury duty. One study of jurors’ satisfaction, which covered six courts in the UK, concluded:

“Despite some particularly negative experiences, many jurors left the court for the last time with positive points to make about their time as a juror. Key among these were the positive learning experience it afforded, meeting new people and the feeling that their civic duty had been done. Nearly three-quarters of jurors said they would be happy or ‘wouldn’t mind’ repeating their duty. Over 95 percent of respondents considered juries very important, essential, quite important, or necessary to our system of justice. Engagement in this important role played a part in generating a sense of satisfaction. The sense of social solidarity that arose from participating in jury service was an important factor generating a sense of satisfaction for some jurors. Others found their service enhanced or helped to forge a sense of national identity or citizenship.”

Competence of ordinary citizens

Even if juries are highly respected, and serving on a jury (or a citizens’ assembly) prompts ordinary citizens to prevail over civic apathy, that does not necessarily mean that such participation is competent. Beyond mere apathy, the issue of basic competency is the cudgel that has been used to bash democracy for millennia. From Greek anti-democrats such as Plato, through countless aristocratic political theorists around the world, to some modern political scientists, every form of democracy has been challenged on the issue of competency. While the notion that we may rely on hereditary nobility, or property-owning maleness as indicators of competence has fallen into disfavor, the ignorance of ordinary voters still gives many people pause. Even the minimal task of casting a competent (informed) vote for a presumably more competent representative is questioned. 

While many modern political theorists view electoral governance in a triumphalist way, as the pinnacle, or end point of human political maturity, there is often an underlying unease about popular competence. Many people actually favor the democratic veneer provided by elections that masks actual rule by a competent elite. While it is considered indiscreet to express this attitude, I suspect it is actually quite widespread. Many people who hold this belief haven’t expressly admitted it, even to themselves. (They also probably don’t put themselves in the bucket with the incompetents they worry about.) Among politicians especially, it is much more judicious to maintain the pretense that they believe voters are wise — especially if they just elected you.¹

In Jason Brennan’s book, Against Democracy, he proposes a “competence principle,” according to which

“it is deemed presumptively unjust, and to violate a citizen’s rights, to forcibly deprive a citizen of life, or property, or to significantly harm their life prospects, as a result of decision made by an incompetent deliberative body, or decisions made in an incompetent way or in bad faith”

He essentially argues that it is unjust to have others suffer because of the choices of politically incompetent individuals. He uses empirical data on voter ignorance to condemn electoral democracy. A solution he offers is to require a competency test to qualify as a voter, and perhaps some sort of “epistocratic council” with the power to veto unwise decisions. While his critique of electoral democracy is well supported by facts (indeed, this book presents a plethora of corroborating details), there is no empirical data to support his speculative hope that disqualifying some voters through a knowledge test would improve the competence of the remaining electorate, who would still suffer from rational ignorance about candidates and issues, partisan tribalism, and cognitive biases. He also, stunningly, gives no consideration to how the interests of these privileged “more competent” voters might differ from the interests of the general population. 

His assertion of a "competence principle" may have merit, and indeed, the bulk of this book has impeached the competence of voters as voters (and also the competence of politicians as decision-makers). But this book has also lauded citizens’ competence as citizens, when convened in mini-publics with good process and appropriate supports. A key distinction needs to be made between the competence of the atomized single voter in a mass, partisan, competitive environment; contrasted with the competence of a diverse group, as a group, when incentivized to deliberate. A more effective solution to Brenan’s “competence principle” would be giving a representative sample of citizens the time, resources and motivation to become well informed — and thus more competent than uninformed voters, whether able to pass Brennan’s proposed test or not.

Education for competency?

The attitude of Thomas Jefferson, that democracy’s remedy for incompetent citizens must be education, is well known. Jefferson wrote in a letter to William Jarvis,²

“I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion with education.”

 Yet, since the 1960’s there has been a steep decline in civics education in schools. The advent of the No Child Left Behind law and more standardized testing worsened this decline because the priority of improving school scores has meant, as the saying goes, “if it isn’t tested, it isn’t taught.” Many of the civics courses that are being taught are dry, with a heavy emphasis on seemingly irrelevant formalisms. Admonitions that “voting is important” just don’t ring true in a society largely alienated from politics. Students can intuitively understand that their individual vote has virtually no chance of actually deciding an election outcome. In addition, many civics classes are offered in 12th grade, after those who are most likely to be politically alienated have already dropped out. But genuine civics education is not primarily about a formal civics curriculum. It comes from being involved in community. Critical thinking, problem solving skills, and the skills to participate effectively in groups are key. Schools can and should teach these things, but too often do not. As Frank Fischer noted in Democracy and Expertise: Reorienting Policy Inquiry, “Americans are first and foremost socialized into the role of consumer, rather than citizen.”

But it would be foolhardy to optimistically rely on hoped for improvements in competence from education, or experience through democratic participation, or as Barber expresses it in Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age: “faith not in what men are, but in what democracy makes them.” There is some evidence that Americans (perhaps including the reader of this book) may underestimate the competence of the majority (especially if given information, opportunity for deliberation, and incentive) to make judgments on public policy. This was a finding of the poll conducted by The Center on Policy Attitudes, associated with the School of Public Affairs of the University of Maryland. People were asked: “Compared to the average American, would you say you are more able or less able to make reasonable judgments about national issues?” Only twenty percent of those surveyed believed they personally were less capable than the average American, while fifty-eight percent thought they were personally more capable. Since, by definition, we know that the true number must be fifty percent being above or below average, this response reveals the widespread underestimation of the general public and/or the overestimation by many individuals’ of their own capability. Theodore Roosevelt said “the majority of the plain people will day in and day out make fewer mistakes in governing themselves than any smaller body of men will make in trying to govern them.” Of course, politicians are wont to “suck up” to the people with insincere praise, so we can’t be certain if this was his genuine assessment.   

But sortition-based democracy asks much more from citizens than the electoral system, which simply asks them to accept or reject representatives as their would-be rulers. Many people might figure voters can handle that minimal task, but worry about giving these avowedly incompetent voters, the more arduous task, and real power, of crafting and adopting legislation, as proposed in this book. The next post will begin that examination.

1. While serving as an elected official, I was amused that politicians love to praise the people of their home state, or home town (depending on the audience) as among the most freedom-loving and hard-working people in the world. Nobody ever objects to such braggadocios pride.

2. William Jarvis introduced the Spanish Merino sheep to America and my home state of Vermont. Jarvis is important in Vermont history, as the Merino sheep boom literally changed the landscape of the state, with dramatic deforestation due to the grazing needs of over a million sheep in the state by 1837. He had made a gift of some of these sheep to Jefferson, as well in 1820.